Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Simons, Peter
Books on Amazon
Four Dimensionalism I 121
Four-dimensionalism/Flux/Simons (instead continuants) - Then Tib and Tibbles do not share all parts. - But non-identity does not exclude mereological extensionality.
I 122
Four-dimensionalism/Flux/Simons: E.g. "Tibbles at t": an instantaneous three-dimensional phase or time-slice of the four-dimensional object Tibbles - predicates: in four-dimensionalism "eternal". - The change is supported by the Termini ((s) nouns) - Then Tibbles = cat process. - Then never = Tib + Tail - different, alhough all parts in common - then no longer extensionality. - To save these, modality must be denied de re - four-dimensionalism pro extensionality, VsModality de re. - "time slice": still whole human. - ((s) The "thinness" lies in the time period). - Quine: physical objects in four-dimensional space time are indistinguishable from processes.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

> Counter arguments against Simons
> Counter arguments in relation to Four Dimensionalism

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01