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|Folk Psychology||I 33f
SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously - SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green) - then both have the same T# -correlated functional role.
N.B.: here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition - it is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. -"if p is true, one believes that p" - N.B. -"p" exists inside and outside the belief context - Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p - Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role.
All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. - Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception.
BurgeVsFolk Psychology BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. - In w he has a correct use of "Arthritis"- then, he has in w not the believe that he has arthritis in his thigh - (because this belief is false). - N.B.: in w he is in exactly the same T* -correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. - Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. - But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987