Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Strawson, Peter F.
 
Books on Amazon
Completeness I 270
Particular/ Universal / completeness / introduction / Strawson: in what sense is a thought in relation to a particular complete, but not of a unversal (U)? - Too vague: particular = construction of facts - U = abstraction from facts - not even thought of a kind of particular-U as an example, which serves as a "substratum" - solution: at the end of facts must be that the particular is not included as a component inclued - then we have a complete thought - but it is incomplete if we move on to the particular because this is part of a further fact - "last facts": only feature-localizing statements like "here is water", etc.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik M√ľnchen 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


> Counter arguments against Strawson



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01