Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Prediction: Prediction is the process of making a statement about what will happen in the future. It can be based on past experience, current trends, or expert knowledge. See also Statements, Assertions, Method, Knowledge, Future, Certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. Fodor on Prediction - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 150 Prediction/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: predictive capability does not need to be based on rationality. It can also be based on regularity. IV 150f Predictability of behavior is not an argument for intentional attribution. We assume regularity instead of indulgence. Law-like connections with split stimuli are sufficient. There is no rationality necessary. >Rationality, >Regularity, >Behavior, >Stimuli, >Attribution._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Prediction
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19