Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Goodman, Nelson
Books on Amazon
Imagination IV 119
A discourse on mental images is not less intersubjectively as a discourse on objects.
IV 115
If having this imagination is constructed with the help of my ability to describe descriptions or images of imagination, then these descriptions are not descriptions or representations of the idea, but rather imagination descriptions and imagination representations.
What happens is rather the replacement of alleged statements about imaginations by statements about objects and events.
IV 124
Imagination image: not intangible image but skill.
I can, for example, say to the extent that I have a horse-imagination, as I am able to draw a horse, or to describe it.
IV 122ff
Sometimes this is uncertain and the linguistic reports cannot always be taken at face value. The request to describe a given imagination as such is easily confused with the request to tell of what the imagination is.
IV 125
The "imagination" and the "image in consciousness" have disappeared. The dangers and the difficulties of interpretation increase when rotation and the like is mentioned. There must be a speech on rotation, which does not presuppose that there are images that swirl around in the head.

N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24