Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Nagel, Thomas
 
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Imagination I 82ff
Of course, we can be wrong in some of our judgments about what is inconceivable and what is not. It is possible that a statement whose falsity we could not imagine still may be untrue. Mere external information about how we got there to hold the statement to be true is not enough.
We may also have imagined something right, but later find out that we have described our actions incorrectly.
I 87~
Imagination: not even temporarily can we "bracket" the basic thought that the contraposition is valid and replace it with the purely psychological observation that we consider the falsity of this statement unimaginable (DescartesVs, see Nagel.)
I 88
NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of ​​confused thoughts also contains the disentangled thought.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23