Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Davidson, Donald
 
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Truth I 56
Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me.
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The T-predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true".
  Object and meta-language should contain the predicate "true".
Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "T-theory".
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) .- Convention T is not sufficiently empirical
The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world.
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II 131
VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism".
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Rorty VI 51
Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional".
A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensonal concept.
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Dav II 28
Interpretation theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning.
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Horwich I 443
Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion.
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Rorty VI 189
Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27