Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Peacocke, Christopher
 
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Truth EMD II 185
Truth/Peacocke: two ways: (i) which is expressed in English by "what he said" when you know that the other person was telling the truth - (ii) in the sense how one can claim that ""it is boring" it is true" if someone expresses it at a time when he is bored - ad (ii): can be expressed in existential quantification: "there is a sentence"- ad (i): cannot be expressed by (ii) - (> Say) - solution: say and truth (plus adequacy) must be defined in terms of the actual language - problem: that involves semantic vocabulary - (> Chess: Winning must be defined externally).
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II 187
Truth/Tarski/actual Language/Peacocke: the concept of truth in this sentence schemes is not the general notion of truth (like e.g. the general concept of winning next to the chess game (Dummett)).

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


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> Counter arguments in relation to Truth



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28