|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
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|Truth||EMD II 185
Truth/Peacocke: two ways: (i) which is expressed in English by "what he said" when you know that the other person was telling the truth - (ii) in the sense how one can claim that ""it is boring" it is true" if someone expresses it at a time when he is bored - ad (ii): can be expressed in existential quantification: "there is a sentence"- ad (i): cannot be expressed by (ii) - (> Say) - solution: say and truth (plus adequacy) must be defined in terms of the actual language - problem: that involves semantic vocabulary - (> Chess: Winning must be defined externally).
Truth/Tarski/actual Language/Peacocke: the concept of truth in this sentence schemes is not the general notion of truth (like e.g. the general concept of winning next to the chess game (Dummett)).
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989