|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
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Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket) - but determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts decisive) - fact possible without believed proposition - problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that! - ((S) due to non-existence) - PriorVs: misconception of belief as a relation to facts.
Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully" - with me no mention (Tarski left, in quotation marks), only use - only about snow, not about truth - no metalanguage - PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - then one can also think that you think something wrong.
Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means) - Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time - then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong - but no "secondary meaning" and "principle B".
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003