|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
|Quine, Willard Van Orman
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|Truth||Rorty I 217
Quine: "Hund" is the German word for "dog" and "Robinson believes in God" this is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "actual".
Instead the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth, Quine offers us a distinction between truth by virtue of convenience and truth by virtue of correspondence.
Quine: truths about meaning, opinions and propositional truths are somehow not real truths - just as applied for the positivists that necessary truths are not really "about the world".
Quine I 55
Truth: QuineVsPeirce infinite confirmation is not ideal but always correctable - false analogy of the limit value of an approach to truth.
Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object - Our special denoting apparatus - but stimulus meaning similar for natives - Goodman’s individual calculus translatable as syllogistic.
Truth is not ambiguous, but universal: a true confession is as true as mathematical law - difference between laws and confessions - Even "existence" is not ambiguous.
"Make true": takes facts as something concrete (VsDummett?).
Truth: not confirmation through evidence - it could always be reinterpreted - Truth is immanent, there is nothing above it - Interpretation is always within a theory.
II 55 f
DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: No thing makes sentences true (make true) - Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to beliefs.
Putnam II 205f
Truth/Quine: is not a property - (where?) - But only recognizes immanent truth - within evolving theory - problem: how to escape solipsism?
Quine VI 109
Truth/Meaning/Quine: 1) sentences themselves bear truth - 2) sentence meaning as truth bearer - Problem: sentence meaning is unclear - dependent on other sentences (circular) - truth value may depend on the situation and intention - i.e. better 1st sentence as the truth bearer - "Proposition": as sentence meaning only timeless sentences, the truth value must not change, even if unknown.
Truth is quote redemption.
Truth/Quine: based on two components: language and extralinguistic reality - but that does not mean that truth could be split into a linguistic and a fact component - (s) because it consists of both, it cannot be separated.
Truth/Tarski/Quine: always only with reference to language - "is white iff" is just gibberish - i.e. a combination of letters that cannot be true.
Truth/language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or signs in one language are equivalent with E.g. 55 - because of this relativity it makes sense to ascribe a truth value only to tokens of sentences.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990