Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Strawson, Peter F.
Books on Amazon
Truth Rorty VI 52
StrawsonVs "Make true": taunted "sentence-like things" ((s) Comparison of world with sentences is not possible in a non-linguistic way).
Ayer I 296
Truth/StrawsonVsAustin: "sure, we use the word 'true' if the semantic conditions described by Austin are satisfied - but by using this word, we do not say that they are fulfilled" (> Austin I 230).
Strawson II 261
Truth/StrawsonVsAustin: mistake: instead of asking, "how do we use the word "true" (use, convention) - he asks: "When ... "(conditions) - facts cannot be changed by changing the language conventions.
II 266
Truth is not property of a speech event.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01