|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
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|Truth||K.Glüer Davidson zur Einführung Junius Hamburg, 1993 S. 22
The defined T-predicate in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination of the true can be restored. - Object and metalanguage should contain the predicate true - Davidson, however, can evade the dilemma by not giving a definition. He calls it a definition of truth in Tarski's style, hereafter referred to as T-theory.
Rorty IV 22
True/Tarski: the equivalences between the two sides of the T-sentences do not correspond to any causal relationship. Davidson: there is no way to subdivide the true sentences so that on the one hand they express "factual", while on the other side they do not express anything.
Berka I 396
Truth/Tarski: we start from the classical correspondence theory.
We interpret truth like this: we want to see all sentences as valid, which correspond to the Tarski scheme - these are partial definitions of the concept of truth. - Objectively applicable: is the truth definition, if we are able, to prove all the mentioned partial definitions on the basis of the meta language.
Berka I 475
Truth-Definition/truth/Tarski: wrong: to assume that a true statement is nothing more than a provable sentence. - This is purely structural - Problem: No truth-definition must contradict the sentence definition - N.B.: but this has no validity in the field of provable sentences - E.g. there may be two contradictory statements that are not provable - all provable statements are indeed content-wise true. The truth definition must also contain the non-provable sentences.
Berka I 482
Definition true statement/Tarski: x is a true statement, notation x e Wr iff. x e AS (meaningful statement) and if every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x. - That does not deliver a truth criterion - no problem: nevertheless the sense of x e Wr (x belongs to the class of true statements) gets understandable and unambiguous. -
Relative Truth/accuracy in the range/Tarski: plays a much greater role than the (Hilbertian) concept of absolute truth, which was previously mentioned - then we modify Definition 22 (recursive fulfillment) and 23 (truth). - As derived terms we will introduce the term of the statement that a) in a domain of individuals with k elements is correct and - b) of the statement that is true in every domain of individuals.
Horwich I 111
Truth/Tarski: is a property of sentences - but in the explanation we refer to "facts" - (quotation marks by Tarski)
Horwich I 124
Truth/true/eliminability/Tarski: cannot be eliminated with generalizations - If we want to say that all true sentences have a certain property. - E.g. All consequences of true sentences are true. - Also not eliminable: in particular statements of the form "x is true": E.g. the first sentence that Plato wrote, is true. - Because we do not have enough historical knowledge. - ((S) The designation -"the first sentence..." is here the name of the sentence - This cannot be converted into the sentence itself. Eliminability: from definition is quite different from that of redundancy.
Tarski I 156
Definition Truth/Tarski: a statement is true when it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false.
Truth/Tarski: with our definition, we can prove the (semantic, not the logical) sentence of contradiction and the sentence definition. - The propositional logic does not includes the term true at all. - truth almost never coincides with provability - all provable statements are true, but there are true statements that cannot be proved. - Such disciplines are consistent but incomplete (Gödel). - There's even a pair of contradictory statements, neither of which is provable.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994