Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Tugendhat, Ernst
Books on Amazon
Truth I 263
Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation (> timeless sentence).
I 267
Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason - otherwise lie and deception would be excluded.
I 285
Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use - VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea.
III 190
Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - Tugendhat VsMeta Language - Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary.
III 196
Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless.
III 208
The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

> Counter arguments against Tugendhat
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29