Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Davidson, Donald
 
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Truth Conditions Dum I 26f
Davidson/Dummett: we can do without a theory of the power of utterances. For him, it is unnecessary to describe or even mention the speech acts of assertion, questions, requests, etc. But Davidson presupposes that the concept of truth must already be understood. If we did not know anyting about it, except that it applies to the definition of truth for propositions of the language in question, we cannot know anything about the meaning of a sentence by specifying the truth conditions. Therefore, a prior understanding of the concept of truth is needed. - But not the conditions. For this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth.

Davidson: one only needs to know the truth conditions (claiming power is superfluous).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23