Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Putnam, Hilary
 
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Truth Conditions I 148f
Truth Conditions/Dummett/Putnam: if one starts from the realism, neither Tarski's theory of truth nor Davidson's theory of meaning have any relevance for the truth of the metaphysical correspondence theory that requires that facts make sentences true. - Problem: how to understand one's own representations? - If there were "thought characters without language", then there must be an understanding a "detecting the truth conditions" before - that would be absurd. - Solution/Davidson: understanding the truth conditions is implicit knowledge of the language (a use of truth conditions as "good translation"). - If one understands "Snow is white", one knows what the case must be. - Then the truth conditions are the same in different languages. - Our use constitutes the truth conditions. - DummettVs: that is correct (a tautology), but no explanation.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23