Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Example for a non-truth-conditional semantics: conditional role semantics.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Cresswell, M.J.
 
Books on Amazon
Truthconditional Semantics I 27
Truth conditional Semantics/Meaning/Promise/truth value/truth condition/action/Cresswell: the truth-conditional semantics does not judge, however, why one should say the truth. I promise to pay you five dollars. The question of truth/falsehood has nothing to do with the purpose of the statement. We can show, however, that the semantic analysis of the word meanings requires that (11) has a certain truth value.
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I 28
The sentence is true if the speaker promises it.
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I 29
Language here becomes a rule-directed means of conveying to the listener a representation of the same set of possible worlds (poss.w.), as given to the speaker. Thus, the concept of the possible world stands in the heart of the semantics and is even more fundamental than the notion of truth.
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II 145
Truth-conditional semantics/Cresswell: Knowing the meaning of a sentence: knowing what the case should be, so that the sentence is true - non-truth-conditional semantics: E.g. Semantics of the conceptual role/Harman. - E.g. Intention-based semantics/Schiffer. - E.g. speech act theory - KatzVsTruth-conditional semantics: all equivalent sentences then have the same meaning.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


> Counter arguments against Cresswell



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30