Books on Amazon
|Truth Predicate||Rorty VI 20
"True"/Davidson: "true" is not a name of a relationship between language statements and the world. In other words: the expression "true" should neither be analyzed nor defined. There is no thing that makes sentences and theories true.
"True" is not synonymous with anything at all. Neither with "justified according to our knowledge", nor with "justified by the circumstances in the world".
Dav II 27
Truth-Predicate/Tarski: Problem: DavidsonVsTarski: object language and meta language should contain the predicate true. - The T-predicate defined in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language. Solution/Davidson: do not set up a T-definition at all - instead: T-Theory/Davidson: Reinterpretation of the convention T as a criterion of appropriateness for T-theories of natural languages.
T-Predicate/Tarski: any predicate that delivers correct translations is a T-predicate. - This presupposes meaning in order to explicate truth.
Truth-predicate/TarskiVsDavidson: provides a structural description of a language whose translation is known. - The T-predicate does not contribute to the truth theory. - It is not interpreted in Tarski. - ((s) we do not know what truth is - T-Predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: is interpreted a priori.) - ((s) we already know what truth is.) - Definition interprets/(s): know what a word means.
Rorty IV 22
True/Davidson/Rorty: does not correspond to any relationship between linguistic expressions and the world. - No correspondence.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000