Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Wright, Crispin
 
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Truth Predicate I 29f
Truth predicate/Wright: two characteristics are necessary: 1. prescriptive and descriptive norm, determined by practice.
Definition descriptive normative (predicate): then if the choice of a move through doers is actually guided in that they follow the judgment or not.
Definition prescriptive normative: if the choice within the practice must be guided in this way.
Definition Deflationism: the T-predicate is with respect to any assertoric (assertive) practice of positive regulatory nature, both prescriptive and descriptive.
  Prescriptive: every reason to think that a sentence is T, can be made a reason to state this sentence.
  Descriptive: the practice exactly looks as if it would look like when the assertoric moves would be deliberately chosen.
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I 32
The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate moves must be confirmed by the actual assertoric practice.
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I 55
Tractatus/Wittgenstein: object and proposition are formal concepts.
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I 56
Minimalism: Wittgenstein's proposal causes that each predicate that has certain very general characteristics, is qualified as a truth predicate. This also works for pluralism.
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I 180
Content/Wright: must comply with discipline and surface syntax (for example, conditional, negation) of a discourse. The so secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes).
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I 221f
Definition truth predicate/Wright: a predicate that is enough for a small amount of basal principles (platitudes among other things on assertion and negation)
  These characteristic features are the only ones which are essential for truth.
  However, they are not sufficient to motivate an intuitive realism regarding a discourse.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01