Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Truth Theory II 21
Truth-Theory/Truth-Definition/TarskiVsField: semantic concepts are not necessary and not philosophically interesting for a T-theory. - - 2. FieldVsTarski: has only lists for denotation:
(e)(a) (e is a name which denotes a) ⇔ (e is "c1" and a is c1) or (e is "c2" and a is c2) or ...
II 24
Truth-Theory/utterance conditions/Truth/T-theory/Quine: (1953b, p. 138) the conditions of expression are all that is needed to make the concept "true" clear. - (Field dito) - E.g. Alabama-Example: a friend says that in the southern state of Alabama is snow which is a foot high. - Therefore, utterance conditions are important. - Question: why do we need causal theories of the reference beyond the Truth-schema? - That does not work anyway, since we are on Neurath's ship ((s). That is, meanings change in the course of language development). - Still: Solution/Field: psychological models about the (inner) connection to reality. - (Do not attach a theory from the outside). - This psychological connection is still physical.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23