## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Prior, Arthur Books on Amazon |
Truth Values | I 51 Truth/the truth/Frege: all phrases denote "truth": because there are no different truths for different sentences, so as it is always the same truth that various accounts are true - analogy: sentences denote the truth, as number names name numbers - PriorVsFrege: false analogy: does not work with propositional attitude: "X believes that p" does not have to be wrong if p is false - (s) while different argument values provide other function values, one can attribute to the other any belief-attitudes (also false) without prejudging with it, if he can believe it - (i.e. whether the compound sentence gets wrong). --- I 6ยง Truth value/Prior: so we make up the term "truth value" for what we describe as identical if the condition (0) is true: (0) Efy i.e. "If f then y and if y then f" (spelling Lesniewski: E = equivalence) - because truth value is the description of the identical, truht value itself is not the "signified" (VsFrege). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24