Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Armstrong, D.M.
Books on Amazon
Truthmakers II 21
Truth Maker/Tr.M./Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" therefore no truth maker - there are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions).
II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./Place: special disposition, finite (like Goodman, nominalist) - ArmstrongVsPlace: tr.m.: law, infinite
II 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-disp properties plus laws of nature are sufficient - two non-occurring, equally likely events: k fact as tr.m. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: k truth maker, k certain way, nevertheless: counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have idiosyncratic.../(s)"idiosyncratic" does not designate the manner nor does it determine it.
II 99
Law/Armstrong:. Truth makers for law statements - atomic state Rel high order between U the number of instantiation is irrelevant, all identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G - Hume: molecular state, GF - Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.
II 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
II 156
Truth Maker/Place: tempting: that the state, which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal GA true from which it is epistemically derived - (Vs"counterfactual facts") - PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176
II 175f
Truth Maker/MartinVsArmstrong: still unclear whether its invocation of laws is strong enough, to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
II 176
Whichever he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: actually is a suitable truth maker: state - problem: state merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term) - Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise trivial - Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate -MartinVsLewis: "the way the universe" is a general term, but still 1st order! - Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation - Existence Theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

> Counter arguments against Armstrong

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26