|Chisholm, Roderick M.
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Perception/ChisholmVsTradition: Appearance rather than feeling - adverbial speech: "feels reddish" - cannot be comparative - hallucination: here it depends on the mode of experience - appearance: divisible> sense data language is permissible - perception: it is epistemically evident to me that the object is there - transcendent evidence: judgment about the object is related to me - perceptible properties: secondary qualities - 1. primary qualities: indirect attribution of a property, 2. non-propositional: the subject takes possession of the property true, self-presenting - does not imply the object .
Perception/Knowledge/Theory of Knowledge/Chisholm: Epistemic Principle 9 de re: x is such that it is evident to x that it is F (less pure) - not applicable if thing does not exist - not to reveal existence non-reflectively, not self-presenting.
Negative perception: seems to demand incompatibility, but it does not have to - Russell: negative perception: empirical propositions, directly known, not developed - Chisholm: e.g. hear nothing: psychological state - negative perception/Whitehead: creates consciousness in first place. - Chisholm pro: Awareness of one's own intentional attitudes.
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
Perception/Rutte: more than experience: taking an external through the senses - experience: could also be purely immanent.
Aporia of perception/Hartmann: how is correspondence possible if the one is consciousness-immanent and the other consciousness-transcendent? - Causing of experiences has very different properties than having experiences.
II ~ 25
Perception problem: not whether we perceive things as they are, but whether we can infer from our experiences a causer. - Rutte: experience-like core of the immediate given (SellarsVs) - perception/Rutte: effect of the object evokes a legal order of experience which causally determines the experiences and provokes expectations.
Perception/Helmholtz: not as an image of properties but their "indications". These are interpreted on the basis of hypotheses - the mode of appearance of a thing is structurally reflected in a certain regular order of our sensory experiences. Hypothetical realism: Schlick, Kraft, Popper, Konrad Lorenz et al.
Perception/Rutte: success/failure already presupposes realism. - linguistic analytical philosophy: criteria for deception - Berkeley: does not exist. VsBerkeley: then there is not even a conceptual distinction of hallucination, but this is presupposed by Berkeley himself.
Realism/Truth/Rutte: whoever wants to know whether there are outside things can perhaps guess the truth about it - there is no truth-oriented way to find it out because no successes or failures can be demonstrated that might speak for or against the assumptions.
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004