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Language/reality - thought/world: the actual relationship between language (thought) and reality cannot be part of reality itself. Reason: an image A must have the same shape as the state of affairs S that is now a picture B, which should reflect the relationship between A and S as a picture ratio, so it would also have to have this form. But then it would either only be identical with A, or it would be the image of another state of affairs of the same shape.
E.g. a painter can paint a different painter, who paints a tree. But how could you picture the mere fact that the painter paints the tree? The picture shows a painter, who paints a tree. But which hyphens in the painting form this situation?
Therefore it is said in the Tractatus: a sentence shows its meaning. (> Showing/Telling/sense - image theory). It is not possible for an imaging elementary proposition to map the sense of the elementary proposition. This is not to be confused with our possibility to express what is stated by a sentence.
Rorty IV 41
Language/world/Wittgenstein/Rorty: according to Wittgenstein any idea that we can get from an independent reality has to remain within the limits of our way of life - NagelVsWittgenstein: (with Kripke): Wittgenstein cannot be reconciled with realism - ((s) but Nagel as Wittgenstein: we cannot enter the world of the bat.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000