Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
Books on Amazon
Free Will V 291
Freedom of Will/Laws of Nature/violate Laws of Nature/Lewis: the fact that we apparently can violate the Laws of Nature depends on the assumption of an intermediate determinism. - The thesis that we sometimes willingly do what we are predetermined to do and that we might act differently in such cases, although the history and the laws of nature determine that we will not act differently. - Compatibilism: thesis that the soft determinism might be true, but there may be a physical foundation for a predetermination. - E.g. I could have raised a hand - then I would have a violated a Law of Nature - This is assumed here only for the sake of the argument of soft determinism.
V 292
Important argument: it does not follow, however, that there is something that is both a law of nature and broken. - For broken laws of nature are a contradiction in adjecto.
V 293
The assumption here serves the differentiation of two theses: weak thesis: an actually unbroken law could have been broken. - Strong: I can break laws of nature. - Important argument: if no act of mine is a law of nature breaking event, then it could not be true that I had broken a law of nature. - ((s) not "as long as ...").
V 295
Freedom of will/break laws of nature/Lewis: E.g. Assuming I raised my hand 10 minutes ago, although it was predetermined that I should not raise it. - Then there was a time before that when the laws were broken. - Important argument: then the causation is the other way around. - The breaking of the laws caused the raising of the hand. - (see above "miracle"). - But the act itself is not the miracle - therefore you do not need any supernatural powers for moderate determinism. - Problem: the effect would precede the cause. - Nevertheless, right counterfactual dependence pattern.
V 296
InwagenVsLewis/Determinism, moderate.
V 297
Lewis: distinction act/event. - It is the act that causes the event of breaking laws. - The act does not falsify a law but only a conjunction of history and law.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

> Counter arguments against Lewis

back to list view | > Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27