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How it is/know how to/scope/McGinn: what logical scope have questions like E.g. How is it to be a bat?
"How-be": We are not quantified here about a single thing, but a type.
Bat: range of all bats.
The "how" of being for the bat is identical with the How-be of the world for the bat.
How does it happen that we know anything at all?
Knowledge/Transcendental Naturalism/TN/McGinn: the transcendental naturalism claims that the gaps are ultimately gaps in our understanding ability. Their origin is of epistemological, not ontological kind.
Knowledge/representation/consciousness/McGinn: "be in the know" does neither require consciousness nor *belief, but only an effective representation.
Bat/Nagel/mind/brain/McGinn: the sonar perception in humans has no counterpart.
But this lack of understanding is not a lack of understanding about the bat brain. We might even know everything about the brain of the bat, without knowing how it feels to be a bat.
E.g. assuming, we can easily imagine a universe in which the vast majority of stars emit no light. In this universe there is much less knowledge. We would have no knowledge of any distances.
So the world must be so that the mind can include its properties in itself.
And there is never a guarantee that the right knowledge mediating relationship really exists. Knowledge is not a matter of course.
Irreducibility/I/McGinn: irreducibility of knowledge: there is only one neurosis of the skeptic. The word "know" has an established use, which meets the conditions of justified assertibility. I simply know that I have two hands. (> Moore's hands). And that is good. (> DIME - domesticated irreducible mystic elimination/McGinn).
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001