Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Lewis, David
 
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Time V 32
Time/Arrow of time/Past/Future/Lewis: future: depends counterfactually (not only causally) on the present - Asymmetry: former things do not depend on later ones - we find no counterfactual conditional that explains what would have been different in the past if the presence was different - such a counterfactual conditional would be unclear at most.
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V 33
Asymmetry: we can use all assumptions about the past, but not about the future - assumptions about the past are not counter factually dependent - therefore they can serve as auxiliary hypotheses.
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V 35
Time/Asymmetry/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Asymmetry: comes about like this: wA>wC assumes that C is later, if C is earlier, the counterfactual conditionals are only true if C is true - the counterfactual conditional tells us, like the way, how things are earlier, not depending on how things are later.
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V 36
Time Arrow/Epistemic/Asymmetry/Lewis: the asymmetry (that we know more about the past than about the future) is gradual, no difference in kinds.
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V 37f
Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Lewis: 1) the epistemic contrast (that we know more about the past) is gradual. - 2) (irrelevant) - 3) Even determinism would allow an asymmetry. - 4) past, present and future are equally unchangeable. - That t is later, is irrelevant.
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V 38
5) in a sense we can change the future by our present actions, however. - Asymmetry: branch in the future: are the alternatives under counterfactual assumptions. - Past: here the fact remains the same, even in counterfactual assumptions.
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V 57
Time/Laws of Nature /LoN/Asymmetry/Lewis: if there is an asymmetry (between past and future). - Then it is a property of time, not of the laws. - It makes a difference between possible worlds.
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V 66
Asymmetry/Time/Lewis: my argument for it is empirical. - Too many traces would have to be hidden later on.
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V 94
Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Possible world/Lewis: the asymmetry is contingent. - i.e. the properties which justify the distinction between past and future opportunities. They may be different from possible worlds to other possible worlds.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28