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|Nonfactualism||Field II 255
Definition "surface logic"/material conditional/paradoxes of implication/Field: the surface logic tells us which conclusions are acceptable. (This is just the logic of Adams offered by nonfactualism).
Definition "depth logic"/material conditional/Field: the depths logic tells us which conclusions are truth maintaining. This is the standard logic for ">".
Problem: does the depth logic do anything at all, even if our mental performance is explained by the surface logic?
Solution/Field: Perhaps one can say that at the deepest level classical logic prevails and the special conventions of the assertion only come later.
Factualism/Field: It must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level (which only seems unacceptable by a superficial violation of the convention).
Deflationism/Field: the deflationism between nonfactualism and factualism can be distinguished in the same way without using the terms "true" or "fact".
Field II 256
Factualism/Conditional/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984): (here, at first limited to non-embedded conditionals): here his approach provides the logic of Adams, i.e. Factualism is indistinguishable from nonfactualism in relation to which conclusions (> paradox of material implication") are considered correct.
Deflationism/Field: can he differentiate between nonfactualism and factualism?
One possibility is that if there are conditionals where the antecedent is logically and metaphysically possible, but not epistemically.
Nonfactualism: thesis: in epistemic impossibility of the anteceding of a conditional, there is no question of acceptability.
For the joke of conditionals consists in the assumption that their antecedents are possible epistemically.
N.B.: then all conditionals with epistemically unacceptable antecedents are equally acceptable.
FieldVsStalnaker: for him there is a fact due to which a conditional is true or false. And some conditionals with epistemically impossible antecedents will be true and others false!
Factualism/Deflationism/Field: the test of whether someone adheres to this type of factualism is then whether he takes acceptability of such conditionals seriously.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980