Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Anscombe, G. E. M.
Books on Amazon
Intensions Frank I 96
I/Intension/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here the "way of givenness" is unimportant.
The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.".
His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as subject, then they true and then if the predicates of x are true.
AnscombeVsLogicAnscombeVsKripke: for this reason, he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes".
But this is too superficial: if you are a speaker who says "I", you cannot find out what it is that says "I". For example, we do not look from which device the sound comes.
Thus, we must require our logicians to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I".
I 98
Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no difference between "I" and "A" (see Logic/Anscombe).

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25