|Anscombe, G. E. M.
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|Logic||Frank I 79
I/AnscombeVsLogic: the logicians never have concepts of their objects because they do not need them. So you cannot come close to the "I", or cannot find its meaning.
Frank I 88
"I"/Logic/Anscombe: from the point of view of logicians, "I" is certainly a proper name.
Fra I 88/89
E.g. Suppose we have a company in which everyone is labeled with two names.
1. The one appears on the back and another on the upper end of the chest (?) (These names, which cannot be seen by the wearers, are different for the wearers, say from "B" to "Z". (?).
"The other name, "A" is imprinted on the inside of their wrists and the same for everyone.
One learns to respond to utterances of the name on one's own chest and back. Self-reports are then made on the basis of conclusions and testimony.
E.g. "B" draws conclusions, expressed by sentences with "A" as the subject, from the statements of other people who use "B" as the subject.
There are reports from B's mouth that say that A did this and that, these are prima facie verified by finding out that B did it.
Thus there is a person for each person, of whom he/she has characteristic limited, but also characteristic, privileged views.
Fra I 90
This does not include self-consciousness. Although everyone knows a lot of the object he/she actually is.
Vs: the thesis that these people do not have self-consciousness may not seem right for this particular reason. B has consciousness of, i.e. he/she watches some of B's and thus his/her own activities.
So he is conscious of himself. So he has self-consciousness.
AnscombeVs: when we speak of self-consciousness, we do not mean this. We mean something that is expressed by the use of "I" as opposed to "A".
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994