# Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Fine-grained, logic, philosophy: statements can be be more or less detailed. E.g. the fine-grained statement (x)(y)(x = y > (N(x = x) > N(x = y))) could be displayed in a coarse-grained way as A > B. For the decision of problems the coarse-grained form is often inadequate. See also decidability, possible worlds, situation semantics, possible world semantics, hyperintensionality.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Block, Ned

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Fine-grained/ coarse-grained Fodor IV 169
Fine-Grained/Twin Earth/Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Theory/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problems with the twin earth point in to a different direction than Frege's problems (intension/extension).
Frege: needs more fine-grained concepts as extensions
Putnam: needs less fine-grained than extensional equivalence. (Narrower conception): Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally distinguished. (Water/Twin-Earth Water).
Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT) will hardly work.
Solution/Block: "Two Factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other:
A) Actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege
IV 170
B) Independent, possibly causal, theory of the reference: (Twin Earth/Water/Twin-Earth Water).
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: this has almost nothing to do with CRT. Moreover, neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) is available. But let's assume it anyway:
For example, we make the distinction of meaning/reference with the "two-factor" theory: we then have enough distinction ability, but pay a high price:
Question: What actually holds the two factors together?
E.g. what prevents the existence of an expression whose inferential role corresponds to the expression "4 is a prime number" and whose content is "water is wet"?
But what would it mean? And what would be expressed?
The problem is repeated at the level of metatheory:
What holds a theory of extension and a theory of meaning together?
BlockVsVs: it is clear to him, and what he says about it is puzzling: "the conceptual role is primarily in the determination of the nature of the reference, but not vice versa."
IV 171
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference!
Conceptual Role/Block: seems to say that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is, after all, causally determined according to Kripke.
Conceptual Role/(s): Difference: a) Conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water,
B) a word class, e.g. name.
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that excludes the confusion between extension and intension.
What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime number/wetness"?
Block: T is not a kind-term, if the causal theory of kind-terms is not true for it.
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that just does not prevent "water" from having the extension of a kind-concept and at the same time the logic of a number concept.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29