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|Minimalism||Wright I 271
Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: they are related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence there is no fact - global minimalism attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism.
Wright I 285
Boghossian: "global minimalism": with the truth also all meaning tilts.
Wright I 291
Meaning-Minimalism/Boghossian, new/Wright: the meaning-minimalism does not have to lead to a global minimalism: the meaning-minimalism is rather bound to contradictory theses and does not provide a coherent explanation for the behavior of the truth predicate. For the meaning-minimalism should accept any of the following assertions:
(5) The predicate "has the truth condition that P" does not refer to a property.
(6) For every proposition S and propositional content P, "S has the truth condition that P" is not truth conditional.
Wright: and these assertions are indeed inconsistent: (5) is necessarily followed by (7):
(7) "true" refers to a property.
While (6) necessarily entails the negation of (7).
Boghossian: one has to decide whether truth is robust or deflationary.
Just as unavoidable, but not to mix with this, is a decision between...
A) the concept of a correspondence of language and (objective) world, or
B) the concept of a language-bound operator of the semantic ascent (words instead of objects).
Solution/Wright: The meaning-minimalist must work with a pluralistic truth opinion (different living beings have different cognitive faculties)! (> Pluralism).
Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007
A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001