## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

Boghossian, Paul Books on Amazon: Paul Boghossian |
Negation | Wright I, 276 Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction between the A) real, strict negation: it transforms every true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form: B) Negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposition (> nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counter-proposal, however, is that A should rather be complementary to the strict concept of the former negation. Then, in the case that A is merely correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative. WrightVsVs: but there are problems at a different end now: the transition of (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only one sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true> "A" has a truth condition --- I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" endangers this principle in the case where A is not true but correct. For then the conservative matrix ""a" is true" is evaluated as correct. The consequent (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 |

> Counter arguments against **Boghossian**

back to list view | > Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29