Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Chalmers, David
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Functionalism I 15
Functionalism/Lewis/Armstrong/Chalmers: Lewis and Armstrong tried to explain all mental concepts, not only some.
ChalmersVsLewis/ChalmersVsArmstrong: both authors made the same mistake as Descartes in assimilating the psychological to the phenomenal (see ChalmersVsDescartes).
E.g. When we wonder whether somebody is having a colour experience, we are not wondering whether they are receiving environmental stimulation and processing it in a certain way. It is a conceptually coherent possibility that something could be playing the causal role without there being an associated experience.
I 15
Funktionalismus/Bewusstsein/ChalmersVsFunktionalismus/ChalmersVsArmstrong/ChalmersVsLewis/Chalmers: es gibt gar kein Mysterium darüber, ob irgendein Zustand eine kausale Role spielt, höchstens ein paar technische Erklärungsprobleme. Warum dabei eine phänomenologische QWualität des Bewusstseins im Spiel ist, ist eine vollkommen andere Frage.
Funktionalismus/Chalmers: dieser leugnet, dass es hier zwei verschiedene Fragen gibt. ((s) Auch: ChalmersVsDennett).

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Functionalism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-23