Books on Amazon:
Cognition/explanation/consciousness/cognitive models/Chalmers: Cognitive models are very good when it comes to explaining things like learning and behavior, but not in the explanation of conscious experience.
In all that is cognitively explained, the question remains why it is accompanied by something like consciousness.
Cognitive models can certainly cover the psychological side of consciousness (behavior explaining, learning, information processing), but not the phenomenal side of conscious experience.
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,...
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language.
ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows is still everything it needs to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the different functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and Chalmers I 370.
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: There are also models by Churchland, (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all applies my criticism VsDennett from above.
Cognition/Chalmers: it is wrong to assume that it is separate from consciousness, even if it belongs to another sphere (the physical). For example, one has a (physical) perception of something green which is psychologically individualized. On the other hand, we also have perceptions about our consciousness.
Cognition/consciousness/psychology/Chalmers: the coherence between conscious experience and cognitive structures is remarkable. We can recognize principles:
Principles: 1. Reliability principle: Our judgments of the second level about consciousness are generally correct.
If I judge that I hear something, then I usually hear something.
2. The principle of deducibility (reversed reliability principle): although many experiences often escape us, we usually have the ability to notice them.
3. Principle of structural coherence: conscious phenomenal experiences are always accompanied by (appropriately characterized) psychological consciousness.
E.g. Structural features of the facial field are reflected in our experiences of larger and smaller, brighter, darker, etc. objects, and also in our reactions to them. This also applies to implicit structures such as relations between colors.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014