Books on Amazon:
Language/Qualia/Phenomenology/Psychology/Chalmers: we have no special language for phenomenal qualities. We must always describe them in terms of external properties, e.g. Colorful experiences.
Feeling language/Ryle: he was right: we have no "neat" words for feeling.
Sensation/Criterion/Wittgenstein: an inner process needs external criteria.
Chalmers: nevertheless, why should one not assume that ultimately only one property (be it phenomenal or psychological) is involved?
ChalmersVs: if a phenomenal property is specified by a psychological concept, it is not a psychological property - it is only a "property specified by a psychological concept".
Definition/specification/Chalmers: we must not say, the concept "conscious experience" was defined by the psychological property! The usually common occurrence of circumstances cannot be used for definition.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014