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|Computer Model||Rorty I 259
Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory if different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware.
The principle of operation of the subroutines, in turn, cannot be made understandable by studying the hardware. Therefore, the understanding of how the subroutines themselves work does not help us in explaining the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. For this, the control process embodying the overall organization of the machine must be considered.
Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching stencils. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but it has nevertheless a genuine explanatory value. The notion of a "subroutine" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation for what benefit this tertium quid between comon sense and physiology might hold.
Dodwell: the subroutines, in turn, cannot be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.)
P. C. Dodwell
Brave New Mind: A Thoughtful Inquiry Into the Nature and Meaning of Mental Life Oxford 1999
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000