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|Learning||I Fred Dretske Minimale Rationalität in D.Perler/M. Wild (Hg.)Der Geist der Tiere
Learning/Behavior/Animal/Consciousness/Dretske: E.g. birds avoid certain butterflies that make them vomit.
Now there are non-toxic butterflies that mimic the color of these poisonous. Now we can ask: why did the bird not eat it? We know why but we have to choose our words carefully: because he does not want to get sick again, but what he saw was not a disgusting insect. No recognition has taken place.
The bird thinks (wrongly) that the insect tastes bad.
The thought directs his behavior. Similar causal behavior as with the thermostat and the plant. So there is something inside the bird, which means (like the bimetallic strip in the thermostat) that an m-kind insect is present, and a switch is actuated.
Unlike the thermostat and the plant: however, the representation for the behavior is directly relevant to the bird.
Purpose: but is the behavior of the bird purposeful? Is the bird thinking of something?
The meaning of the internal element is genuinely explanatory. ((s) but for us, not for the bird).
Thinking/Animal/Dretske: for me this sounds sufficiently of thoughts, in order not to have to bargain what is still missing.
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997