Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Fichte, J. G.
Books on Amazon
I, Ego, Self Nozick II 89
I/Fichte: the I sets itself as self-settling. - NozickVsFichte: can we conjure the rabbit from the rabbit? - But pro Fichte: otherwise we would have to assume a preexisting self and again ask for the origin.
II 92
Preexisting: if only the last momentary act of synthesis constitutes the self, but reverts to preexisting entities, they would be extinguished when looking into the past because the last act is the synthesis. - Then the preexisting things would not be the I.
II 94
Preexisting/Solution/Nozick: the person preexists - but not independent of the act of synthesis. Difference: person/self.
Bubner I 108
I/Fichte/Bubner: Action of the self-settling I.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26