|Statement: once a statement is made the utterer is committed to it. In contrast to this, a sentence can be thought of as a string of symbols that is no statement.|
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|Statements||II R. M. Hare Philosophische Entdeckungen in Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Grewendorf II 133
Statements/tradition/Hare: Hare divides statements into empirical and analytical ones. In addition to that there seems to be nothing else.
Problem: one can easily assume on the basis of a confusion that the proposition, which states that the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytic.
But it is at least not obviously true that
E.g. the statement "propositions of the form 'p and not p'are analytically false" should be analytically true. Is it not a statement of how the words "and not" are used?
And is it not analytically true that they are used in this way and not otherwise?
Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytically, as well as empirically, as well as neither of both options.
Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein calls the discussion "nonsensical." > Silence.
CarnapVsWittgenstein: his behavior is contradictory: instead of being silent, he writes a whole book.
HareVsCarnap: does not take Wittgenstein's doubts seriously enough.
G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle
Linguistik und Philosophie Frankfurt 1995