|Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation.|
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|Denotation||Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote!
Theory of denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: the theory of denotation contains the reduction of denotation on objects of acquaintance.
Hintikka: this connection is amazing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance.
Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
Unambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are permitted, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is indeed a primary event, that is, his example (2).
"Whether"/"if"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: Russell and Hintikka wanted to know if "instead of" "did not know".
Secondary Denotation/Russell: one can also say that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley if he was Scott.
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?".
HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a to-know-who does not exist.
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996