Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Hintikka, J.
 
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Identity I 77
Identity/object/thing/semantics of possible worlds/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must be assumed as a basic concept.
HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well-founded. Perhaps one must, however, presuppose the criteria of identification and of identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that does not mean that the problem of identification is not a permanent problem for philosophers.
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I 151
Knowing-who/Identity/Psychology/Psychiatry/Hintikka: there are interesting examples here. One must be able to recognize oneself as the same in different situations.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-24