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|Space Time||I 81
Spacetime/Identification/KripkeVsHintikka/QuineVsHintikka/Hintikka: Kripke and Quine argue (for different reasons) that spacetime continuity does not always have a precise meaning.
SaarinenVsHintikka: the identity of individuals, which occur in several worlds, is not always well-defined for all these possible worlds.
Hintikka: ditto: it may be in belief contexts that an individual is identified under a description, but not under another description.
This must also be the case, otherwise we would be omniscient again.
Possible worlds: we must also be careful to adopt a "common reason" from all possible worlds. We certainly do not share a part of the space-time, but part of the facts. ((s) epistemic rather than ontologic).
World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Substance/Hintikka: in Wittgenstein, the world is the sum of the facts, not of the objects: to a shared space-time this would only be by additional assumptions.
Cross-world identification/Hintikka: the cross-world identification seems lost when we are dealing only with a lot of facts ((s) epistemically) and a common space-time is missing.
Re-identification: re-identification of physical objects is necessary first to get to the cross-world identification later.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: the expression possible world presupposes that a space-time is shared.
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996