Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Epiphenomenalism, philosophy of mind: theories that conceive the mind as a side effect of brain processes, the mind itself does not cause any effects. See also supervenience, identity theory, mind, brain, materialism, reductionism, dualism, property dualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
F. Jackson on Epiphenomenalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Schiffer I 152 Epiphanomenalism/Jackson/Schiffer: MaterialismVsEpipenomenalism/MaterialismVsProperties of belief: (Jackson 1982(1), 135): Properties of belief (as epiphenomena) do nothing, they do not explain anything, they only soothe the intuitions of the dualist. It is a mystery how they should fit into science. >Dualism, >Monism. JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the critique of materialism rests on an too optimistic view of the animal that the human is, and his abilities. Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: Jackson argues only for Qualia to be epiphenomena. Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: Materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain kind, if one has no coherent representation how and why this should happen. SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P has caused having B, then this should be subsumed under a psychophysical extended causal law. At least some mechanism would have to explain the connection between B and P. I 153 But this does not exist most likely (especially when you consider that it should be possible that different physical states might have B!) And what should be a non-legal mechanism at all? >Phenomenalism. 1. Jackson, Frank. 1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
||
> Counter arguments against Jackson
> Counter arguments in relation to Epiphenomenalism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19