|Jackson, Frank C.
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Frank C. Jackson
|Identity Theory||Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie Das Leib Seele Problem in der angelsächsischen Philosophie des Geistes von 1949 bis 1987 in Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: For example: Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist has access to the world only via black-and-white screens. He knows everything there is to know in terms of science about the visual system of human beings. Let's suppose he'll get a color screen. Is it not obvious that he is now learning something new, namely how colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: This leaves that out.
MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about different discriminatory abilities! The one recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it another recognizes a feature due to sensory states.
So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world! (> Representation).
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000