|Jackson, Frank C.
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Frank C. Jackson
|Propositions||Black I 207 (Note)
Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by inserting as the world parameter the world of the respective situation (correspondingly the time parameter for the point of time of the situation, etc.).
Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions.
Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a, 38, 1994b, 296f).
Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1 Intension/Terminology/Black: the first intension is for primary truth conditions.
Definition C Intension/Secondary Intension/2 Intension/Terminology/Black: the second intension is for secondary truth conditions.
Definition A Proposition/1 Proposition/C Proposition/2 Propsition/Terminology/Black: this works correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a, 2004, Lewis 2002b, Chalmers 1996b, 5665)
Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Black: (1975,173): meaning 1 are secondary truths conditions.
Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning 2 is a complex function of situations and worlds on truth value, "two-dimensional intension".
Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: primary truth conditions are not determined in Lewis by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not over a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions.
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Bedeutung und Intention
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979
Sprache München 1973
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983