|Jackson, Frank C.
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Frank C. Jackson
|Qualia||Pauen V 179
Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike nail.
E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum.
E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space.
Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences.
2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism).
Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel).
LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand.
JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people.
What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not.
Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities.
LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them.
This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected.
A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson.
Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable.
Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all.
N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states.
LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities.
Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions!
This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way!
VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible".
Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios.
In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity.
VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena.
1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties.
2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable.
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001