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|Ultimate Justification||Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight.
Holz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change.
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself).
Holz I 51
Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself.
Evidence is not a logical category.
Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin.
Logic/Husserl: logic has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content.
Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical.
Holz I 75
Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole!
Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series.
Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all
Holz I 83
Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason.
Two principles are sufficient:
1. Principle of contradiction
2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking.
This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel.
In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied.
Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form.
Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted.
Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate.
Holz I 123
Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization.
Now it turns out that the two principles:
1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself)
2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all.
One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place).
But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all.
The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths:
Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first.
According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all.
In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible).
A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions).
From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992