|Possible World: entity that can be quantified over. There ist a dispute over the question whether possible worlds exist or are only assumed for purposes of proofs of completeness. See also actual world, modal logic, modal realism, realism, actualism, possibility, possibilia, quantification.|
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|Possible Worlds||Hintikka I 74
Possible Worlds/VsSemantic of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: it seems to make the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia absolute ((s) to assume them as self-evident).
Possible worlds/Leibniz: Thesis: there is a fixed set of worlds from which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios.
We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable.
Holz I 120
Possible worlds/Leibniz/Pape/Holz: is for Leibniz the negative background of a positive world. The background, by virtue of which the positivity of the one realized world first acquires its justification. Namely, in a comprehensive sense of a logical, ontological and moral justification!
The force of the negation is stronger than that of the position.
Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: a world is always the totality of everything real and possible, and this possible is the real possible (puissance) of which the real is a selected partial quantity.
Possible worlds/LeibnizVsKripke: other possible worlds cannot be worlds of other possibilities (otherwise this (our) world (the actual world) would not be a world, but only a partial quantity).
One must not multiply the world's things by several worlds, for there is no number that is not in this one world, or even in each of its parts.
To introduce another species of existing things is to misuse the concept of existence.
World/Leibniz: not the sum of the parts, but their ordered connection. The world is the world law composing the individuals.
Order/Leibniz: does not arise from the world, but the world itself is the order, the order is the world-creating one.
Now however, due to the a priori necessary principles (see above) no other order than the existing one is to be thought of!
Possible worlds/Leibniz: therefore, worlds, which are structurally different from ours, remain undefined in content and unthinkable. They would be mere shadow worlds.
It is, however, impossible for a priori thinking to exclude the possibility of such differently ordered worlds.
Leibniz: the conceivability of possible worlds is a necessary possibility of thinking.
Solution/Leibniz: and these possible worlds would still be formally possible as actual non-worlds even if there were no world at all, but nothing.
Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: as worlds, however, they are only possible when they are not nothing.
This is due to the fact that the (definition) possible ontological cannot be determined otherwise than as force, which urges to utter.
The nothingness of possibility, however, would not be conceivable because it would not be a possibility and thinking is always thinking of at least possible. (If necessary, the possible nothing!)
Nothing/Leibniz: is then a possibility among other things. In the infinitesimal sense, the minimization of the possible or a world whose content tends toward zero, whose possibilities mutually cancel each other out.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992