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|Ontology||Holz I 59f
Ontology/Construction/World/Experience/Rationality/Identity/Leibniz: the construction of the ontology of Leibniz has two phases:
1. Deducability of all sensible, i.e. true and knowledge having sentences are proved by reducing them to identical sentences. (Deduction/reduction). (Predicative evidence).
2. The evidence of identity is to be proved as such to the world itself. Identity as the cause of the world is to find its cause once again in the constitution of the being of the world.
Holz I 78
Logical/ontological/Leibniz/Holz: this transition from the concept of the infinite ((s) infinite because of infinitely many aspects) chain contained in the experienced limited finite a priori to the idea of the necessary being of the world has, in addition to the ontological one, a logical aspect:
Logical: every being, every fact, is conditioned by all others. Therefore the concepts (predicates) of all others are to be assigned to the concept of a being!
The inherence of all the other concepts in each individual concept, however, does not make any sense in terms of its logical extent (extensional). It cannot be performed as a predication (operational, finite).
Undesirable consequence: the concept of each individual would then be the supreme and the emptiest generic concept of all beings.
With this, it would not be a representation of the concrete individual anymore!
Solution: the relation of the individual to the general (whole) can be expressed intensional (content-logical): the concept of the individual contains all possible predicates in a unique arrangement. That is, these predicates as a whole belong to all concepts of individuals in a different arrangement.
Each concept has the same quantity of predicates, but it is not identical with all other concepts because the arrangement is correspondingly different.
Holz I 91
Logical/ontological: thus the logical constitution of the subject-being proves to be the ontological constitution of the world.
Genus/World/Leibniz: the world can also be represented as the supreme genus, ontologically as the fullness of all possible reality.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992